SC judgement on OBC quota : Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs Union of India and others

CASE NO.:
Writ Petition (civil) 265 of 2006

PETITIONER:
Ashoka Kumar Thakur

RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2008

BENCH:
Dalveer Bhandari

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.265 OF 2006 WITH
Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.269 AND 598 of 2006, Writ
Petition (Civil) Nos.29, 35, 53, 336, 313, 335, 231,
425, 428 of 2007 AND Contempt Petition (C) No.112 of
2007 in Writ Petition (C) No.265 of 2006.
* * * * *

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. The 93rd Amendment to the Constitution directly or indirectly affects millions of citizens of this country. It has been challenged in a number of writ petitions. This Court heard these petitions intermittently over the course of several months. Appearing on behalf of petitioners and respondents, the country's finest legal minds assisted us.

2. The fundamental question that arises in these writ petitions is: Whether Article 15 (5), inserted by the 93rd Amendment, is consistent with the other provisions of the Constitution or whether its impact runs contrary to the Constitutional aim of  achieving a casteless and classless society?

3. On behalf of the petitioners, Senior Advocate Mr. F.S. Nariman, eloquently argued that if Article 15 (5) is permitted to remain in force, then, instead of achieving the goal of a casteless and classless society, India would be converted into a caste-ridden society. The country would forever remain divided on
caste lines. The Government has sought to repudiate this argument. Petitioners' argument, however, echoes the grave concern of our Constitution's original Framers.

4. On careful analysis of the Constituent Assembly and the Parliamentary Debates, one thing is crystal clear: our leaders have always and unanimously proclaimed with one voice that our constitutional goal is to establish a casteless and classless society. Mahatma Gandhi said: "The caste system as we know is
an anachronism. It must go if both Hinduism and India are to live and grow from day to day." The first Prime Minister, Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru, said that "no one should be left in any doubt that the future Indian Society was to be casteless and classless". Dr. B. R. Ambedkar called caste "anti-national".

5. After almost four decades of independence, while participating in the Parliamentary Debate on the Mandal issue, then Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi on 6th September, 1990 again reiterated the same sentiments: "I think, nobody in this House will say that the removal of casteism is not part of the
national goal, therefore, it would be in the larger interest of the nation to get rid of the castes as early as possible". It is our bounden duty and obligation to examine the validity of the 93rd Amendment in the background of the Preamble and the ultimate goal that runs through the pages of the Constitution.

6. To attain an egalitarian society, we have to urgently remove socio-economic inequalities. All learned counsel for the petitioners asserted that we must deliver the benefits of reservation to only those who really deserve it. This can only be done if we remove the creamy layer. Learned counsel for the Union of India and other respondents opposed this assertion. The principle of creamy layer emanates from the broad doctrine of equality itself. Unless the creamy layer is removed from admissions and service reservation, the benefits would not reach the group in whose name the impugned legislation was passed
the poorest of the poor. Therefore, including the creamy layer would be inherently unjust.

7. Creamy layer exclusion, however, is just one of the many issues raised by the parties. I need to examine various facets of this case in order to decide the validity of the 93rd Amendment and the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Bill, 2006 (passed as Act 5 of 2007) (hereinafter called the "Reservation Act"). I shall focus my analysis on the following issues:

1A. Whether the creamy layer be excluded from the 93rd Amendment (Reservation Act)?

1B. What are the parameters for creamy layer exclusion?

1C. Is creamy layer exclusion applicable to SC/ST?

2. Can the Fundamental Right under Article 21A be accomplished without great emphasis on primary education?

3. Does the 93rd Amendment violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution by imposing reservation on unaided institutions?

4. Whether the use of caste to identify SEBCs runs afoul of the casteless/ classless society, in violation of Secularism.

5. Are Articles 15 (4) and 15 (5) mutually contradictory, such that 15 (5) is unconstitutional?

6. Does Article 15 (5)'s exemption of minority institutions from the purview of reservation violate Article 14 of the Constitution?

7. Are the standards of review laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court applicable to our review of affirmative action under Art 15 (5) and similar provisions?

8. With respect to OBC identification, was the Reservation Act's delegation of power to the Union Government excessive?

9. Is the impugned legislation invalid as it fails to set a time-limit for caste-based reservation?

10. At what point is a student no longer Educationally Backward and thus no longer eligible for special provisions under 15 (5) ?

11. Would it be reasonable to balance OBC reservation with societal interests by instituting OBC cut-off marks that are slightly lower than that of the general category?

8. I have carefully examined the pleadings and written submissions submitted at length. Admittedly, the provisions of the Constitution and the Preamble lead to the irresistible conclusion that the Nation has always wanted to achieve a casteless and classless society. If we permit this impugned legislation to be implemented, I am afraid, instead of a casteless and classless India, we would be left with a caste-ridden society.

9. The first place where caste can be eradicated is the classroom. It all starts with education. In other words, if you belong to a lower caste but are well qualified, hardly anyone would care about your caste. Free and compulsory education is now a fundamental right under Article 21A. The State is duty bound to implement this Article on a priority basis. There has been grave laxity in its implementation. This laxity adversely affects almost every walk of life. In my opinion, nothing is more important for the Union of India than to implement this critical Article.

10. I direct the Union of India to set a time-limit within which this Article is going to be completely implemented. This time-limit must be set within six months. In case the Union of India fails to fix the time-limit, then perhaps this work will also have to be done by the Court.

11. The Union of India should appreciate in proper prospective that the root cause of social and educational backwardness is poverty. All efforts have to be made to eradicate this fundamental problem. Unless the creamy layer is removed, the benefit would not reach those who are in need. Reservation
sends the wrong message. Everybody is keen to get the benefit of backward class status. If we want to really help the socially, educationally and economically backward classes, we need to earnestly focus on implementing Article 21A. We must provide educational opportunity from day one. Only then will the
casteless/ classless society be within our grasp. Once children are of college-going age, it is too late for reservation to have much of an effect. The problem with the Reservation Act is that most of the beneficiaries will belong to the creamy layer, a group for which no benefits are necessary. Only non-creamy layer OBCs can avail of reservations in college admissions, and once they graduate from college they should no longer be eligible for post-graduate reservation. 27% is the upper limit for OBC
reservation. The Government need not always provide the maximum limit. Reasonable cut off marks should be set so that standards of excellence greatly effect. The unfilled seats should revert to the general category.

12. These issues first arise out of the text of the impugned Amendment. Reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes of Citizens (SEBCs) was introduced by the 93rd Amendment.

Article 15 (5) states:

"Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making
any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to
their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or
unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30."

? Excluding the Creamy Layer from receiving special benefits:

13. Affirmative action is employed to eliminate substantive social and economic inequality by providing opportunities to those who may not otherwise gain admission or employment. Articles 14, 15 and 16 allow for affirmative action. To promote Article 14 egalitarian equality, the State may classify citizens into
groups, giving preferential treatment to one over another. When it classifies, the State must keep those who are unequal out of the same batch to achieve constitutional goal of egalitarian society.

? Arguments of the Union of India in regard to the creamy layer:

14. Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned Solicitor General and Mr K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate appearing for the Government contend that creamy layer exclusion is a bad policy. They argue that if you exclude the creamy layer, there would be a shortage of candidates who can afford to pay for higher education. This
argument harms rather than helps the Government. It cannot be seriously disputed that most of the college-going OBCs belong to the creamy layer for whom reservations are unnecessary; they have the money to attend good schools, tuitions and coaching courses for entrance exams. Naturally, these advantages result in higher test scores vis-`-vis the non-creamy layer OBCs. The result is that creamy OBCs would fill the bulk of the OBC quota, leaving the non-creamy no better off than before. If the creamy get most of the benefit, why have reservations in the first place?

Learned Senior Counsel for petitioners, Mr. Harish Salve, is justified in arguing that before carrying out Constitutional Amendments the Union of India must clearly target its beneficiaries. He rightly submitted that we should not make law first and thereafter target the law's beneficiaries. Failure to exclude the creamy layer is but one example of this problem.

15. The Government further submitted that the creamy layer should be included to ensure that enough qualified candidates fill 27% of the seats reserved to OBCs. The Oversight Committee disagreed. The Committee relied on data from Karnataka to disprove the contention that seats go unfilled when the creamy is excluded: "the apprehension that seats will not be filled up if the creamy layer is excluded has been comprehensively shown to be unfounded." [See: Oversight Committee, Vol. 1, Sept. 2006, p.
69, para 1.7.] We shall later review the Oversight Committee opinion in greater detail.

? The reasons for which the creamy layer should be excluded:

16. At the outset, I note that the Parliament rejected the Hindi version of the Reservation Act. The Hindi version of the Reservation Act would have expressly excluded the creamy layer. [See: Prof. Rasa Singh Rawat's comments in the Parliamentary Debate on the Reservation Act, 14 December 2006]

17. The Parliament eventually passed the English version in which the creamy layer is not mentioned, making its intention clear. It wanted to include the creamy layer. For all practical purposes, it did so. Therefore, I will treat it as included. Counsel for the Union of India argued that it is still theoretically
possible for the executive to exclude the creamy layer. Much is possible in theory. Given the executive's failure to take action since the time the Act was passed, I find this argument unavailing.

18. With the Parliament's intention in view, I will deal in some detail with the reasons as to why the creamy layer should be excluded from reservation. I do so because I want to emphasize that the creamy layer must never be included in any affirmative action legislation. It also becomes imperative to gather the original Framers' and the Framers' intention. At the outset, we recognise a distinction between the original Framers and the Framers, i.e., Members of the First Parliament. Members of the Constituent Assembly and the First Parliament were one in the same. But the distinction is necessary to the extent that the First Parliament deviated from its constitutional philosophy. By examining the debate on Article 15 (4), I may ascertain whether the Framers wanted to exclude the creamy layer.

19. The First Parliament believed that "economic" was included in the "social" portion of "socially and educationally backward." Prime Minister Nehru said as much:

"One of the main amendments or ideas put forward is in regard to the addition of the word "economical".
Frankly, the argument put forward, with slight variation, I would accept, but my difficult is this that when we chose those particular words there, "for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes", we chose them because they occur in article 340 and we wanted to bring them bodily from there. Otherwise I would have had not the slightest objection to add "economically". But if I added "economically" I would at the same time not make it a kind of cumulative thing but would say that
a person who is lacking in any of these things should be helped. "Socially" is a much wider word including
many things and certainly including economically. Therefore, I felt that "socially and educationally" really
cover the ground and at the same time you bring out a phrase used in another part of the Constitution in a slightly similar context." (See: the Parliamentary Debates on First Amendment Bill, 1 June 1951, p.
9830.)

Had it not been for a desire to achieve symmetry in drafting, "economically" would have been included. Had this been done, the creamy layer would have been excluded ab initio.

20. In the 15 (4) debate, Shri M.A. Ayyangar's wanted to add "economic" to ensure that the rich SEBCs would not receive special provisions. "I thought "economic" might be added so that rich men may not take advantage of this provision. In my part of the country there are the Nattukkottai Chettiars who do not care to have English education, but they are the richest of the lot should there be special reservation for them?" (See: The Parliamentary Debates on First Amendment Bill, 1 June 1951, p. 9817.)
(emphasis added).

This hesitation aside, Shri M.A. Ayyangar was satisfied that the term "economic" was included in the term "social." The Framers were worried about creamy layer inclusion, albeit under a different name. They wanted to ensure that the "richest of the [backward] lot" would not benefit from special provisions. With
their sentiment on our side, we are even more confident that we should strike out in the direction that strikes down laws that include the creamy layer.

? Including the creamy layer means unequals are treated as equals in violation of the right to equality under Articles 14, 15 and 16.

21. In the present case, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, the learned Senior Counsel and Mr. S.K. Jain, the learned counsel vehemently argued on behalf of petitioners that it is precisely because equality is at issue that the creamy layer must be removed. The creamy layer has been the subject matter of a number of
celebrated judgments of this Court. In a seven Judge Bench in State of Kerala & Another v. N. M. Thomas & Others (1976) 2 SCC 310, Justice Mathew, in his concurring judgment, dealt with the right to equality in the following words:

"66. The guarantee of equality before the law or the equal opportunity in matters of employment is a
guarantee of something more than what is required by formal equality. It implies differential treatment of
persons who are unequal. Egalitarian principle has therefore enhanced the growing belief that
Government has an affirmative duty to eliminate inequalities and to provide opportunities for the exercise of human rights and claims. "
(emphasis added)

22. In Indra Sawhney & Others v. Union of India & Others (1992) Supp (3) SCC 217, (hereinafter referred to as Sawhney I), this Court has aptly observed that reservation is given to backward classes until they cease to be backward, and not indefinitely. This Court in para 520 (Sawant, J.) has stated as
under:

"Society does not remain static. The industrialisation and the urbanisation which necessarily followed in its wake, the advance on political, social and economic fronts made particularly after the commencement of the Constitution, the social reform movements of the last several decades, the spread of education and the advantages of the special provisions including reservations secured so far, have all undoubtedly seen at least some individuals and families in the backward classes, however small in number, gaining sufficient means to develop their capacities to compete with others in every field. That is an undeniable fact. Legally, therefore, they are not entitled to be any longer called as part of the backward classes whatever their original birthmark. It can further hardly be argued that once a backward class, always a backward class. That would defeat the very purpose of the special provisions made in the Constitution for the advancement of the backward classes, and for enabling them to come to the level of and to compete with the forward classes, as equal citizens."
(emphasis supplied).

23. For our purposes, creamy layer OBCs and non-creamy layer OBCs are not equals when it comes to moving up the socio-economic ladder by means of educational opportunity. Failing to remove the creamy layer treats creamy layer OBCs and non-creamy layer OBCs as equals. In the same paragraph, Justice
Sawant stated that " to rank [the creamy layer] with the rest of the backward classes would amount to treating the unequals equally..." violating the equality provisions of the Constitution.

24. According to the Kerala Legislature, there was no creamy layer in Kerala. The legislation was challenged in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India & Others (2000) 1 SCC 168, (hereinafter referred to as Sawhney II). The Court struck the two provisions that barred creamy layer exclusion, concluding
that non-inclusion of the creamy-layer and inclusion of forward castes in reservation violates the right to equality under Article 14 and the basic structure.

25. In Sawhney II at para 65, the Court had gone to the extent of observing that not even the Parliament, by constitutional amendment, could dismantle the basic structure by including the creamy layer in reservation:

"What we mean to say is that the Parliament and the legislature in this country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of which Article 16 (1) is a facet. Whether the creamy layer is not excluded or whether forward castes get included in the list of backward classes, the position will be the same, namely, that there will be a breach not only of Article 14 but of the basic structure of the Constitution. The non-exclusion of the creamy layer or the inclusion of forward castes in the list of backward classes will, therefore, be totally illegal. Such an illegality offending the root of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to be perpetuated even by constitutional amendment."

26. By definition, the creamy and non-creamy are unequal when it comes to schooling. Relative to their non-creamy counterparts, the creamy have a distinct advantage in gaining admission. While the creamy and non-creamy are given equal opportunity to gain admission in the reserved category, this equality exists in name only. Will the OBC daughter of a Minister, IAS officer or affluent business owner attend better schools than her non-creamy counterpart? Yes. Will she go to private tuitions unaffordable to her non-creamy counterpart? Certainly. And where will she cram for the all-decisive entrance exams? In a coaching center? Of course. Will she come home from school to find a family member waiting? Probably. And when she seeks help from her parents, are they educated and able to give superior assistance with schoolwork? Most likely.

27. I take judicial notice of these anecdotes, for they flesh out a simple fact: she has all the resources that her non-creamy counterpart lacks. It is no surprise that she will outperform the non-creamy. On average, her lot will take the reserved seats.

28. I cannot consider the OBC Minister's daughter and the non-creamy OBC as equals in terms of their chances at earning a university seat; nor can I allow them to be treated equally. To lump them in the same category is an unreasonable classification. Putting them in head-to-head competition for the
same seats violates the right to equality in Articles 14, 15 and 16.

29. In its conclusion at para 122, M. Nagaraj & Others v. Union of India & Others (2006) 8 SCC 212, a Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with Article 16 (4A) and 16 (4B) with regard to SC and ST observed as under:-

"We reiterate that the ceiling limit of 50%, the concept of creamy layer and the compelling reasons, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative efficiency are all constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity in Article 16 would collapse."

It was contended that Nagraj is obiter in regard to creamy layer exclusion. According to Nagraj, reservation in promotion for SC/ST is contingent on exclusion of the creamy layer. (paras 122, 123 and 124). The contention of the Union of India cannot be accepted. The discussion regarding creamy layer is far from obiter in Nagraj. If the State fails to exclude the SC/ST creamy layer, the reservation must fall. Placing this contingency in the conclusion makes the discussion of creamy layer part of the ratio.

30. In sum, creamy layer inclusion violates the right to equality. That is, non-exclusion of creamy layer and inclusion of forward castes in reservation violates the right to equality in Articles 14, 15 and 16 as well as the basic structure of the Constitution.

? If you belong to the creamy layer, you are not SEBC.

31. One of the prominent questions raised in the writ petitions is whether creamy layer OBCs should be considered socially and educationally backward under the provisions of Article 15 (5). While interpreting this provision, a basic syllogism must govern our decision. If you belong to the creamy layer, you are socially advanced and cannot be given the benefit of reservation. (See: Sawhney I).

32. Once one is socially advanced, he cannot be socially and educationally backward. He who is socially forward is likely to be educationally forward as well. If either condition (social or educational) goes unmet, one cannot qualify for the benefit of reservation as SEBC. Being socially advanced, the creamy layer
is not socially backward pursuant to Articles 15 (4) and 15 (5) of the Constitution.

33. Even the text of Articles 15(4) and 15(5) provides for creamy layer exclusion. In this sense, one could say that the term "creamy layer" is synonymous with "non-SEBC".

34. Similar interpretation is given to "backward classes" under Article 16 (4). The Parliament could not reasonably make reservation for non-backwards. Such a Bill on the face of it would violate the Constitution. In Sawhney I, the Government of India issued an O.M. on 13 August 1990, reserving 27% of
Government posts to SEBCs. Writing for the majority, at para 792 of page 724, Justice Reddy explained that the creamy layer was not SEBC.

"The very concept of a class denotes a number of persons having certain common traits which distinguish them from the others. In a backward class under Clause (4) of Article 16, if the connecting link is the social backwardness, it should broadly be the same in a given class. If some of the members are far too advanced socially (which in the context, necessarily means economically and, may also mean
educationally) the connecting thread between them and the remaining class snaps. They would be misfits
in the class. After excluding them alone, would the class be a compact class. In fact, such exclusion
benefits the truly backward"

Even though the O.M. was silent on the issue of creamy layer, Justice Reddy excluded the creamy layer at para 859 (3) (d). The O.M. could not go into effect until the creamy layer was excluded. [para 861(b)]. Exclusion was only in regard to OBC; SC/ST were not touched. (para 792). In Sawhney I, the entire
discussion was confined only to Other Backward Classes. Similarly, in the instant case, the entire discussion was confined only to Other Backward Classes. Therefore, I express no opinion with regard to the applicability of exclusion of creamy layer to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

? Creamy Layer OBCs are not educationally backward

35. In addition to social backwardness, the text of 15 (5) demands that recipients are also educationally backward. Even though the creamy layer's status as socially advanced is sufficient to disqualify them for preferential treatment, the creamy layer from any community is usually educated and will want the same for its children. They know that education is the key to success. For most, it made them. People belonging to this group do not require reservation.

? Creamy Layer Inclusion Robs the Poor and Gives to the Rich:

36. In a number of judgments, the view has been taken that the creamy layer's inclusion takes from the poor and gives to the rich.

37. Our Courts in following cases had taken the same view. [See: N.M Thomas (supra), para 124 (seven-Judge Bench); K.C. Vasanth Kumar & Another v. State of Karnataka, 1985 (Supp) SCC 714, paras 2, 24 and 28 (five-Judge Bench); Sawhney I., paras 520, 793 and 859(3) (d) (nine-Judge Bench); Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar & Others (1995) 5 SCC 403, paras 3, 17 and 18 (two-Judge Bench); Sawhney II, paras 8-10, 27, 48 and 65-66 (three-Judge Bench); Nagaraj (supra), paras, 120-124 (five-Judge Bench); Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala, (2007) 4 SCC 1; paras 31 and 49-54 (two-Judge Bench)].

38. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India & Others (1981) 1 SCC 246, Justice Iyer had this to say about the creamy layer:

"92. Maybe, some of the forward lines of the backward classes have the best of both the worlds and
their electoral muscle qua caste scares away even radical parties from talking secularism to them. We
are not concerned with that dubious brand. In the long run, the recipe for backwardness is not creating a
vested interest in backward castes but liquidation of handicaps, social and economic, by constructive
projects. All this is in another street and we need not walk that way now.

94. Nor does the specious plea that because a few harijans are better off, therefore, the bulk at the
bottom deserves no jack-up provisions merit scrutiny. A swallow does not make a summer. Maybe, the State may, when social conditions warrant, justifiably restrict harijan benefits to the harijans among the
harijans and forbid the higher harijans from robbing the lowlier brethren."

39. Creamy layer inclusion was not enough to strike an entire provision in this case. He suggests that creamy layer exclusion is an issue to be dealt with at a later time.

"98. The argument that there are rich and influential harijans who rob all the privileges leaving the serf-level sufferers as suppressed as ever. The Administration may well innovate and classify to weed out the creamy layer of SCs/STs but the court cannot force the State in that behalf."

Thus, Justice Iyer does not mandate creamy layer exclusion; rather, he leaves the question to the State.

40. Apart from judicial pronouncements, the Oversight Committee suggested that failure to exclude the creamy layer would lead to unfair results. The Committee was cautious to reach a conclusion.

41. In its Report, it stated that " the decision taken was to leave the matter to the Government of India, keeping in mind the fact that the 'creamy layer' is not covered in the Reservation Act, 2006." (See: Oversight Committee, Vol. 1, p. 33 and 4.2.)

42. Before "leaving" the matter to the Government, the Committee nevertheless made its recommendation: "In case it is decided not to exclude the 'creamy layer', the poorest among the
OBCs will be placed at a disadvantage." (emphasis added). (See: Oversight Committee at Appendix I in its Report at p. 70, para 1.13). At page 69 of Vol. I of its Report, the Committee offered data to support this conclusion:

"1.6: Appendix-2 examines in detail the status of the socio-economic development of OBCs in respect of
such parameters as relate to poverty, health, education, unemployment, workforce participation, land ownership etc. The analysis of the NSS data clearly brings out that inclusion of the creamy layer will result in reserved seats getting pre-empted by the OBCs from the top two deciles at the cost of the poorer income deciles of the OBCs. Thus almost all rural OBCs as well as Urban OBCs from the Northern,
Central and Eastern regions of India will be deprived of the intended benefits of reservation.
[emphasis added]

1.7: On the other hand, it was argued that if the creamy layer of OBCs is denied access to reservation
in education pari-passu with the principle applied in the case of employment, the reserved seats may not get filled up, again defeating the purpose of bringing in reservation for the OBCs. In a case study from
Karnataka (included in Annexure X), it has been clearly shown that the OBC quotas have been utilized
without any compromise with academic excellence in a situation where the creamy layer has been excluded. The apprehension that seats will not be filled up if the creamy layer is excluded has been comprehensively shown to be unfounded. The case study shows that the performance of students from below the creamy layer is outstanding and much better than general category students."

43. The Committee could have played it safe. Despite some opposition, the Committee included its opinion on the matter. And that opinion is unequivocal: the creamy must be excluded.

44. What is allegedly for the poor goes to the rich. Is that reasonable? Trumpeted by the Parliament as a "boost to the morale of the downtrodden" and " in the right direction of ensuring social justice to other backward classes" and "ensuring social justice to those weaker sections ", Article 15 (5) dupes those who actually need preferential treatment. (See: Prof. Basudeb Barman, M.P., the Parliamentary Debates, p. 531, December 21, 2005; Prof. M. Ramadass, M.P., at p. 510; and Shri C.K. Chandrappan, M.P., at p. 494 respectively). For the poorest of the poor, reservation in college is an empty promise. Few of the financially poor OBCs attend high school, let alone college. Instead of rewarding those that complete Plus 2, the 93rd Amendment (Art 15 (5)) poses another barrier: they will have to compete with the creamy layer for reserved seats.

45. As explained, the poor lack the resources to compete with the creamy, who "snatch away" those seats. {N. M. Thomas (supra), para 124 (Iyer, J.)}. With the creamy excluded, poor OBCs would compete with poor OBCs the playing field levelled. As it stands, the Amendment and Act serve one purpose: they
provide a windfall of seats to the rich and powerful amongst the OBCs. It is unreasonable to classify rich and poor OBCs as a single entity. As noted, this violates the Article 14 right to equality.

46. Unless the creamy layer is removed, OBCs cannot exercise their group rights. The Union of India and other respondents argued that creamy layer exclusion is wrong because the text of the 93rd Amendment bestows a benefit on "classes", not individuals. While it is a group right, the group must contain only those individuals that belong to the group. I first take the entire lot of creamy and non creamy layer OBCs. I then remove the creamy layer on an individual basis based on their income, property holdings, occupation, etc. What is left is a group that meets constitutional muster. It is a group right that must also belong to individuals, if the right is to have any meaning. If one OBC candidate is denied special provisions that he should have received by law, it is not the group's responsibility to bring a claim. He would be the one to do so. He has a right of action to challenge the ruling that excluded him from the special provisions afforded to OBCs. In this sense, he has an individual right. Group and individual rights need not be mutually exclusive. In this case, it is not one or the other but both that apply to the impugned legislation.

? Whether the Creamy Layer exists outside India?:

47. An interesting question arises: does the concept of creamy layer exist outside India? A 2003 study carried out in the United States suggests that it does. The study by William Bowen, former president of Princeton University, found that when you look at students with the same Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores, certain groups have a better chance of being admitted to college. "The New Affirmative Action," by David Leonhardt, New York Times, 30 September 2007, p. 3. All things being equal, one's chance of gaining admission is augmented by belonging to one of the preferred groups. Individuals belonging to these groups are given preferential treatment over those who do not.

48. The study demonstrated that Black, Latino and Native-Americans with the same SAT scores as White or Asian students had a 28% better chance than the White or Asian students at gaining admission; those whose parents attended the college had a 20% advantage over those whose parents did not; and the poor received no advantage whatsoever over the rich. (See: New York Times article, p. 3.)

49. The statistics indicate that the failure to exclude the creamy layer ultimately leads to a situation in which deserving students are excluded. When we revert to the Indian scenario, as long as the Government gives handouts to certain groups, the creamy layer therein will "lap" them up. A scheme in which the poor receive no advantage can be remedied by excluding the creamy layer.

50. Even the Mandal Commission, which was established in 1979 with a mandate to identify the socially and educationally backward, admitted that the creamy layer was robbing fellow OBCs of reservation. In reference to Tamil Nadu, it said: "In actual operation, the benefits of reservation have gone primarily to the relatively more advanced castes amongst the notified backward classes." (See: P.37, 8.13 of the Report of the Backward Classes Commission, First Part, Vols. 1-2, 1980). It also stated that: "it is no doubt true that the major benefits of reservation ..will be cornered by the more advanced sections .." but reasoned that this was acceptable because reform is presumably slow and should start with the more
advanced of the backward. (See: Page 62, para 13.7 (recommendations)).

51. In N. M. Thomas & Others case (supra), Krishna Iyer, J. in his concurring judgment in para 124 noted that the research conducted by the A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna, had revealed a dual society among harijans in which a tiny elite gobbles up the benefits.

? Severing the Creamy Layer

52. Technically speaking, I am severing the implied inclusion of the creamy layer. It is severable for two reasons. First, a nine-Judge Bench in Sawhney I severed a similar provision wherein the creamy layer was not expressly included, upholding the rest of the O.M.'s reservation scheme. Second, because the
Parliament must have known that Sawhney I had excluded the creamy layer, it seems likely that the Parliament also realized that this Court may do the same. A cursory review of the Parliamentary Debates regarding Article 15 (5) clearly reveals that the Parliament discussed the Sawhney I judgment in detail.
(See: for example, comments made by Shri Mohan Singh, p.474 and Shri Devendra Prasad, pages 478-479 on 21 December 2005). Had the Parliament insisted on creamy layer inclusion, it could have said as much in the text of 15 (5). Instead, the Parliament left the text of 15 (5) silent on the issue, delegating the
issue of OBC identification to the executive in Section 2 (g) of the Reservation Act.

53. The test for severability asks a subjective question: had the Parliament known its provision would be struck would it still have passed the rest of the legislation? (See: R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla & Another v. Union of India & Another, AIR 1957 SC 628 at page 637 at para 23). It is never easy to say what the Parliament would have done had it known that part of its amendment would be severed. Nevertheless, I find it hard to imagine that the Parliament would have said, "if the creamy is excluded, the rest of the OBCs should be denied reservation in education." It seems unlikely that it would have been an all-or-
nothing proposition for the Parliament, when the very goal of the impugned legislation of promoting OBC educational advancement does not depend on creamy layer inclusion. For these reasons, I sever or exclude the implied inclusion of the creamy layer.

? Identification of Creamy Layer

54. Income as the criterion for creamy layer exclusion is insufficient and runs afoul of Sawhney I. (See: page 724 at para 792). Identification of the creamy layer has been and should be left to the Government, subject to judicial direction. For a valid method of creamy layer exclusion, the Government may use its
post-Sawhney I criteria as a template. (See: O.M. of 8-9-1993, para 2(c)/ Column 3, approved by this Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur (supra), para 10). This schedule is a comprehensive attempt to exclude the creamy layer in which income, Government posts, occupation and land holdings are taken into account. The Office Memorandum is reproduced hereunder:

"No. 36012/22/93- Estt (SCT)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension
(Department of Personnel & Training)
New Delhi, the 8th September, 1993
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Reservation for Other Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of
India
Regarding.
The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's O.M. No.36012/31/90-Estt(SCT) dated 13th August, 1990 and 25th September, 1991 regarding reservation for Socially and Economically Backward Classes in Civil Posts and Services under the Government of India and to say that following the
Supreme Court judgment in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India & Others (Writ Petition (Civil) No.930 of 1990) the Government of India appointed an Expert Committee to recommend the criteria for exclusion of the socially advanced persons/ sections from the benefits of reservation for Other Backward Classes in
civil posts and services under Government of India.

2. Consequent to the consideration of the Expert Committee's recommendation this Department's Office Memorandum No.36012/31/90-Estt. (SCT), dated 13.8.1990 referred to in para (1) above is hereby modified to provide as follows:-

(a) 27% (Twenty seven percent) of the vacancies in civil posts and services under the Government of India, to be filled through direct recruitment, shall be reserved for the Other Backward Classes. Detailed instructions relating to the procedure to be followed for enforcing reservation will be issued separately.

(b) Candidates belonging to OBCs recruited on the basis of merit in an open competition on the same standards prescribed for the general candidates shall not be adjusted against the reservation quota of 27%.

(c) (i) The aforesaid reservation shall not apply to persons/ sections mentioned in column 3 of the
Schedule to this Office Memorandum.
(ii) The rule of exclusion will not apply to persons working as artisans or engaged in hereditary occupations, callings. A list of such occupations, callings will be issued separately by the Ministry of Welfare.

(d) The OBCs for the purpose of the aforesaid reservation would comprise, in the first phase, the castes and communities which are common to both the lists in the report of the Mandal Commission and the State Government's Lists. A list of such castes and communities is being issued separately by the
Ministry of Welfare.

(e) The aforesaid reservation shall take immediate effect. However, this will not apply in vacancies where the recruitment process has already been initiated prior to the issue of this order.

3. Similar instructions in respect of public sector undertakings and financial institutions including public sector banks will be issued by the Department of Public Enterprises and by the Ministry of Finance respectively from the date of this Office Memorandum.

SCHEDULE

Description of Category
To whom rule of exclusion will
apply.

I.

CONSTITUTIONAL
POSTS

Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) President of India;

(b) Vice President of India;

(c) Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts;

(d) Chairman & Members of UPSC and of the State Public Service Commission; Chief Election Commissioner; Comptroller & Auditor General of India;

(e) Persons holding Constitutional positions of like nature.


II.

SERVICE CATEGORY

A. Group A/Class 1 officers of the All India Central and State Services (Direct Recruits)

Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) parents, both of whom are Class I officers;

(b) parents, either of whom is a Class I officer;

(c) parents, both of whom are Class I officers, but one of them dies or suffers permanent
incapacitation.

(d) parents, either of whom is a Class I officer and such parent dies or suffers permanent
incapacitation and before such death or such incapacitation has had the benefit of employment in
any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years.

(e) parents, both of whom are class I officers die or suffer permanent incapacitation and before such death or such incapacitation of the both, either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years.

(f) Provided that the rule of exclusion shall not apply in the following cases :-

(a) Sons and daughters of parents either of whom or both of whom are Class-I officers and such parent(s) dies/ die or suffer permanent incapacitation.

(b) A lady belonging to OBC category has got married to a Class-I officer, and may herself like to apply for a job.

Group B/Class II officers of the Central & State Services (Direct Recruitment)

Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) parents both of whom are Class II officers.

(b) parents of whom only the husband is a Class II officer and he gets into Class I at the age of 40 or earlier.

(c) parents, both of whom are Class II officers and one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation and either one of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years before such death or permanent incapacitation;

(d) parents, of whom the husband is a Class I officer (direct recruit or pre-forty promoted) and the
wife is a Class II officer and the wife dies; or suffers permanent incapacitation; and

(e) parents, of whom the wife is a Class I officer (Direct Recruit or pre-forty promoted) and the husband is a Class II officer and the husband dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.

Provided that the rule of exclusion shall not apply in the following cases:

Sons and daughters of

(a) Parents both of whom are Class II officers and one of them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.

(b) Parents, both of whom are Class II officers and both of them die or suffer permanent incapacitation, even though either of them has had the benefit of employment in any International Organisation like UN, IMF, World Bank, etc. for a period of not less than 5 years before their death or permanent incapacitation.

C. Employees in Public Sector Undertakings etc.

The criteria enumerated in A & B above in this Category will apply mutatis mutandi to officers holding equivalent or comparable posts in PSUs, banks, Insurance Organisations, Universities, etc. and also to equivalent or comparable posts and positions under private employment, Pending the evaluation of the
posts on equivalent or comparable basis in these institutions, the criteria specified in Category VI below will apply to the officers in these Institutions.


III.

ARMED FORCES INCLUDING PARAMILITARY FORCES
(Persons holding civil  posts are not included)

Son(s) and daughter(s) of parents either or both of whom is or are in the rank of Colonel and above in the Army and to equivalent posts in the Navy and the Air Force and the Para Military Forces;

Provided that:-

(i) if the wife of an Armed Forces Officer is herself in the Armed Forces (i.e., the category under consideration) the rule of exclusion will apply only when she herself has reached the rank of Colonel;

(ii) the services ranks below Colonel of husband and wife shall not be clubbed together:

(iii) if the wife of an officer in the Armed Forces is in civil employment, this will not be taken into account for applying the rule of exclusion unless the falls in the service category under item No.II in which case the criteria and conditions enumerated therein will apply to her independently.


IV.

PROFESSIONAL CLASS AND THOSE ENGANGED IN TRADE AND INDUSTRY

(I) Persons engaged in profession as a doctor, lawyer, Chartered Accountant, Income-Tax Consultant,
financial or management consultant, dental surgeon, engineer, architect, computer specialist, film artists
and other film professional, author, playwright, sports person, sports professional, media professional or any other vocations of like status. Criteria specified against Category VI will apply:

(II) Persons engaged in trade, business and industry
Criteria specified against Category VI will apply:

Explanation:

(i) Where the husband is in some profession and the wife is in a Class II or lower grade employment, the income/ wealth test will apply only on the basis of the husband's income.

(ii) If the wife is in any profession and the husband is in employment in a Class II or lower rank post, then the income/ wealth criterion will apply only on the basis of the wife's income and the husband's income will not be clubbed with it.

V.

PROPERTY OWNERS

A. Agricultural holdings

Son(s) and daughter(s) of persons belonging to a family (father, mother and minor children) which owns

(a) only irrigated land which is equal to or more than 85% of the statutory ceiling area, or

(b) both irrigated and unirrigated land, as follows:

(i) The rule of exclusion will apply where the pre-condition exists that the irrigated area (having been brought to a single type under a common denominator) 40% or more of the statutory ceiling, limit for
irrigated land (this being, calculated by excluding the unirrigated portion). If this pre-condition of not less than 40% exists, then only the area of unirrigated land will be taken into account. This will be done by converting the unirrigated land on the basis of the conversion formula existing, into the irrigated type. The irrigated area so computed from unirrigated land shall be added to the actual area of irrigated land
and if after such clubbing together the total area in terms of irrigated land is 80% or more of the statutory ceiling limit for irrigated land, then the rule of exclusion will apply and dis-entitlement will occur.

(ii) The rule of exclusion will not apply if the land holding of a family is exclusively unirrigated.

B. Plantations

(i) Coffee, tea, rubber, etc.
(ii) Mango, citrus, apple plantations etc.

Criteria of income/wealth specified in Category VI below will apply.

Deemed as agricultural holding and hence criteria at A above under this Category will apply.

C. Vacant land and/or buildings in urban areas or urban agglomerations
Criteria specified in Category VI below will apply.

Explanation: Building may be used for residential, industrial or commercial purpose and the like two or more such purposes.


VI.

INCOME/WEALTH TEST
Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a) Persons having gross income of Rs.1 lakh or above or possessing wealth above the exemption limit as prescribed in the Wealth Tax Act for a period of three years.

(b) Persons in Categories I, II, III and VA who are not disentitled to the benefit of reservation but have income from other sources of wealth which will bring them within the income/wealth criteria mentioned in (a) above.

Explanation:

(i) Income from salaries or agricultural land shall not be clubbed;

(ii) The income criteria in terms of rupee will be modified taking into account the change in its value every
three years. If the situation, however, so demands, the interregnum may be less.

Explanation: Wherever the expression "permanent incapacitation" occur in this schedule, it shall mean
incapacitation which results in putting an officer out of service.

Smt. Sarita Prasad
Joint Secretary to the Government of India."

55. In sum, the schedule excludes the children of those who hold constitutional posts, e.g., the children of the President of India, Supreme Court Judges, Chairman and Members of UPSC and others are excluded. Class 1 Officers' children are not eligible for OBC perks either. When both parents are Class-II
Officers, their children are excluded. The same criteria that apply to Class-I and II officers apply to children of parents who work at high levels within the private sector. Agricultural owners are excluded when their irrigated holdings are more than or equal to 85% of the statutory ceiling. The O.M. further excludes persons having a gross annual income of Rs.2.5 lakh or more. The Government raised the income limit from Rs.1 to Rs.2.5 lakh on 09.03.2004 vide O.M. 36033/3/2004.

56. The creamy layer schedule of the O.M. dated 8.9.93, in my opinion, is not comprehensive. This should be revised periodically - preferably once in every 5 years, in order to ensure that creamy layer criteria take changing circumstances into account.

57. Apart from the people who have been excluded vide the office memo, I urge the Government to make it more comprehensive. The Government should consider excluding the children of sitting and former Members of Parliament (MP) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLA) from special benefits. If
constitutional authorities have been excluded from benefits because of their status or resources, the same should apply to children of former and sitting MPs and MLAs. I hope the judiciary will not have to involve itself in this matter.

2. Applying Article 21A to the Reservation Act

58. On 18 December 2006, in the Rajya Sabha Debate on the Reservation Act, Member of Parliament and former Governor, Dr. P.C. Alexander summed up what would become one of Petitioners' arguments. Should Rs.17,000 crores be spent on implementing the Reservation Act for higher education when primary/ secondary schooling is in such bad shape? Dr. Alexander stated:

"Sir, this spending Rs.17,000 crores or whatever amount is needed for adding seats in the Engineering
colleges, IIMs and IITs is reversing our priorities. If you have the money for education, spend it on schools. Spend it on the rural areas for primary schools; spend it on the schools, which are poorly
starved in the urban areas. Instead of doing that, you spend it by adding to the numbers because you want to appease the so-called poorer sections in the higher castes. So, we have taken care of you and you tell the backward classes we are taking care of all of you. This is where we land ourselves in trouble. We have cash resources. They should be spent where priorities are fixed clearly in our eyes and we don't want to do that."

Spending on higher at the expense of lower education raises the specter of conflict with Article 21A. By the 86th Amendment, Article 21A was inserted in our Constitution. Article 21A reads as follows:

"The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen
years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine."

59. Under Article 21A, it is a mandatory obligation of the State to provide free and compulsory education to all children aged six to fourteen. In order to achieve this constitutional mandate, the State has to place much greater emphasis on allocating more funds for primary and secondary education. There is no
corresponding constitutional right to higher education. The entire Nation's progress virtually depends upon the proper and effective implementation of Article 21A.

60. This Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (1993) 1 SCC 645 para 166 held as under:

"right to education is implicit in and flows from the right to life guaranteed by Article 21. That the right to
education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual [and] has been recognized not only in this country since thousands of years, but all over the world. Without education being provided to citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail."

This observation encouraged the Parliament to insert Article 21A into the Constitution.

61. In Unni Krishnan (supra), Justice Reddy observed that the quality of education in Government schools was extremely poor and that the schools were woefully inadequate to the needs of the children. He noted that many countries spend 6% to 8% of Gross Domestic Product on education. Our expenditure on
education is just 4% of GDP.

62. Though an improvement over past performance, the overall education picture leaves much to be desired. The bad news is really bad. Even where we have seen improvement, there is still failure. A survey by Pratham, an NGO, fleshes out the acute problems found in rural schools. (See: ASER 2007 Rural Annual
Status of Education Report for 2007, published on January 16, 2008). The survey covered 16,000 villages. As Pratham indicates, there are an estimated 140 million children in the age group 6 to 14 years in primary schools. Of these 30 million cannot read, 40 million can recognize a few alphabets, 40 million can read some words, and 30 million can read paragraphs. Over 55 million of these children will not complete four years of school, eventually adding to the illiterate population of India. The national literacy rate is 65%.

63. 24 districts with more than 50,000 out of school children means we have failed 24 times over. 71 districts in which there are 60 students per teacher is just as bad, if not worse. According to Pratham (and in line with the Ministry of HRD's six-month review), the number of out of school children has hovered around 7,50,000. [page 6]. Moreover, it goes without saying that children need proper facilities. Today, just 59% of schools can boast of a useable toilet. [page 49].

64. The quality of education is equally troubling. For standards I and II, only 78.3% of students surveyed could recognize letters and read words or more in their own language. [page 47]. In 2006, it was even worse only 73.1% could do so. It is disheartening to peruse the statistics for standards III to V, where only 66.4% could read Standard I text or more in their own language in 2007. [page 47]. As Pratham stated at page 7:

"What should be more worrying though, is the fact that in class 2, only 9 percent children can read the
text appropriate to them, and 60 percent cannot even recognise numbers between 10 and 99."

65. In the third to fifth standards, 40% of students surveyed could not subtract. The latest figures indicate that 58.3% children in the fifth standard read at the level appropriate for second Standard students. [page 32]. In both 2005 and 2007, only 74.1% of enrolled children were in attendance. [page 49].

66. The learned Solicitor General, Mr Vahanvati, submitted that the Government has now placed sufficient emphasis on primary education. In 2001-2002, the Government launched Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). This national programme's goal is to universalize elementary education. It supplements Governmental spending on education. As the Solicitor General explained, it was founded on the idea that education for those between the ages of six to fourteen is a fundamental right. In this way, SSA seeks to fulfill the Government's obligation under Article 21A to provide free and compulsory education to this age group. Some of the SSA's accomplishments merit mention.

67. By March 2007, 2,03,577 toilets had been constructed or were under construction, covering 87% of the goal; more than six crore free textbooks had been supplied 96% of the goal; 1,93,220 new schools had been completed or were under construction, i.e., 80% of the desired mark. The learned Solicitor
General further provided that enrolment for all districts in 2004-05 for classes I-V was 11,82,96,540. In 2005-06, the number increased to 12,46,15,546. A similar increase was seen in Classes VI-VII/VIII: from 3,77,17,490 to 4,36,67,786. The total number of teachers increased from 36,67,637 in 2003-04 to
46,90,176 in 2005-06.

68. It is the learned Solicitor General's contention that SSA was responsible for many of the gains cited above. This includes the improved statistics on the student-teacher ratio, out of school children and enrollment rate for girls.

69. While the Government is on the right track with regard to improving the infrastructure of our system, books and buildings only go so far. They are necessary but not sufficient for achieving the ultimate goals of (1) keeping children in school, (2) ensuring that they learn how to think critically and (3) ensuring
that they learn skills that will help them secure gainful employment. The quality of education provided in the majority of primary schools is woeful. That is why I find it necessary to review Government spending on education especially at the primary/secondary level.

70. Undoubtedly, the Government has allocated more funds of late for education, but we need to have far more allocation of funds and much greater emphasis on free and compulsory education. Anything less would flout Article 21A's mandate. According to H.R.D. Annual Reports read with the Union of India
Budget 2008-09, we spend roughly seven times as much on the individual college student than the individual primary or secondary student.

Spending per Student: Comparing that which is spent on each primary/secondary student versus each higher education student
Year & Level of
Schooling
Estimated # of
Enrolled Students*
Total Rs.
Allocated**
Expenditure per
student in Rs.
2006-2007
School Education/
Literacy
219083879
168970000000
771
2006-2007
Tertiary Education
11777296
69120900000
5868
2007-2008
School Education/
Literacy
219083879
231913500000
1059
2007-2008
Tertiary Education
11777296
63973600000
5432
2008-2009
School Education/
Literacy
219083879
278500000000
1271
2008-2009
Tertiary Education
11777296
108528700000
9215
* = Estimated number of students for primary/secondary level is taken from
2004-2005 Annual Report, p. 250 at
http://www.education.nic.in/AR/AR0607-en.pdf. In the same Annual
Report, 11777296 students were enrolled in higher education in 2004-
2005. For consistency's sake, I have used the 2004-2005 estimates. I have
found no information that suggests that enrolment for one has significantly
outpaced the other.

** = Government of India, Expenditure Budget Vol. 1, 2008-2009, p. 6, Total Expenditure
of Ministries/Departments (school education/literacy and higher education have been added).

71. In a country where only 18% of those in the relevant age group make it to higher education, this is incredible. See NSSO 1999-2000. It is not suggested that higher education needs to be neglected or that higher education should not receive more funds, but there has to be much greater emphasis on the primary education. Our priorities have to be changed. Nothing is really more important than to ensure total compliance with Article 21A. How can a sizeable portion of the population be precluded from realizing the benefits of development when almost everyone acknowledges that the children are our future?

72. Education for children up to the age of fourteen years should be free. This has also been suggested in the recommendations of the Kothari Commission on Education in 1966. Taking the country's rampant poverty into account, free education up to the age 14 years is absolutely imperative. There is no other way for the poor to climb their way out of this predicament.

73. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Senior Advocate, rightly submitted that when you lack a school building, teachers, books and proper facilities, your schooling might be "free" but it is not an "education" in any proper sense. Adequate number of schools must be established with proper infrastructure without further
delay. In order to achieve the constitutional goal of free and compulsory education, we have to appreciate the reality on the ground. A sizeable section of the country is still so poor that many parents are compelled to send their children to work. The State must carve out innovative policies to ensure that parents send their children to school. The Mid-Day Meal Scheme will go a long way in achieving this goal. But, apart from Mid-Day Meals, the Government should provide financial help to extremely poor parents.

74. In addition to free education and/or other financial assistance, they should also be given books, uniforms and any other necessary benefits so that the object of Article 21A is achieved. Time and again, this Court, in a number of judgments, has observed that the State cannot avoid its constitutional
obligation on the ground of financial inabilities. (See: Hussainara Khatoon & Others (III) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna (1980) 1 SCC 98, 107 at para 10).

75. In Vasanth Kumar (supra) at para 150, Justice Venkataramiah suggested that the State provide preferential treatment such as tuition, scholarships, free boarding and lodging, etc. According to UNESCO's Education for All, Global Monitoring Report (2008) at page 115, at least fourteen countries
have cash-transfer programmes that target poor households with school-age children. The largest programme is in Brazil, where 46 million people receive an education transfer of up to $44 USD
monthly per household in extreme poverty with children below age 16. According to the Report, the programme has reduced drop-out rates by up to 75% among beneficiaries in its more recent stage.

76. Such a programme is not foreign to India. According to UNICEF, the State of Gujarat put the idea of financial incentives for youth into action:

"Figures indicate that the school enrolment drive of the state Government supported by incentives like
Vidyalaxmi bond of Rs.1,000 given to each girl who completes primary education and 60 kg of wheat for
tribal girls attending school, has met with significant success. In addition to the various incentives by the
Government, many a corporate houses and community have also come forward to motivate parents and children by donating school bags, uniforms, stationery, etc. As a result, the drop-out rate has come down from 35.31 % in 1997-1998 to 3.24% in 2006-2007 in class 1-5. In girls, this rate has dropped from 38.95% to 5.97 in the same time period."


77. In January 2008, Haryana Chief Minister Mr. Bhupinder Singh Hooda unfurled an incentive scheme for SC students in which students would receive a one-time payment in addition to a monthly stipend for attending school. (See: "Incentives announced to curb dropout rate", The Tribune, 5 Jan. 2008). The relevant portion is mentioned hereinbelow:

"Secretary, education, Rajan Gupta said a one-time allowance of Rs.740 to Rs.1,450 would be given to SC
students from class I to XII. Under the monthly incentive scheme, boys and girls studying in class I to
V would be given Rs100 and Rs.150, respectively, per month and boys and girls of class VI to VIII Rs.150
and Rs.200. Similarly, boys and girls of class IX to XII would be given Rs.200 and Rs.300, respectively, and boys and girls studying science subjects in class XI and XII Rs.300 and Rs.400, respectively. This
monthly incentive to the students would be deposited in their bank accounts to maintain transparency in
the scheme, he added."

78. In the name of transparency, students' attendance records could be made available to administrators and parents. Students would be paid to attend school. They would receive a sum for each day of school that they attended. If you only attend 7 out of 10 school days, you would only receive 70% of the stipend.

79. Ultimately, this is the most important aspect of implementing Article 21A, incentives should be provided to parents so that they are persuaded to send their children to school. More than punishment, creative incentive programmes will go a long way in the implementation of the fundamental right
enshrined under Article 21A.

? Historical Perspective on Compulsory Education:

80. Almost two centuries ago, Clause 43 of The Charter Act of 1813 made education a State responsibility. [See: "Free and Compulsory Education: Genesis and Execution of Constitutional
Philosophy", Dr. P.L. Mehta and Rakhi Poonga, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi (1997)]. [pages 42-47]. The Hunter Commission (1882-83) was the first to recommend universal education in India. Thereafter, the Patel Bill, 1917 was the first compulsory education legislation. It proposed to make
education compulsory from ages 6 to 11.

81. The Government of India Act, 1935 provided that "education should be made free and compulsory for both boys and girls." Free and compulsory education got a further boost when the Zakir Hussain Commission recommended that the State should provide it. The 1944 Sargent Report strongly
recommended free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen. By 1947, primary education had been made compulsory in 152 urban areas and 4995 rural areas.

82. The State has been making some endeavour to provide free and compulsory education since 1813 in one form or the other. When the original Framers gathered at the Constituent Assembly, their desire to provide free and compulsory education was well established. The real question in the Debate was
whether the original Framers would make free and compulsory education justiciable or not. They oscillated between the options, first placing it in the fundamental rights and later moving it to the directive principles of State policies under Article 45 of the Constitution.

83. Over 50 years later, the Parliament revisited the subject. The Parliamentary debate on Article 21A offers a glimpse into the history of compulsory education in other countries. The then Minister of Human Resource Development, Dr. M.M. Joshi, referred to the speech of Shri Gopal Krishna Gokhale on compulsory education. While debating a bill in the imperial legislative council in 1911, Shri Gokhale said that in most countries:

"elementary education is both compulsory and free, and in a few, though the principle of compulsion
is not strictly enforced or has not been introduced it is either wholly or for the most part gratitutious, in India alone it is neither compulsory nor free. Thus in Great Britain and Ireland, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Belguim, Norway, Sweden, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and Japan it is compulsory and free. . In Spain, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania, it is free, and in theory, compulsory, though compulsion is not strictly enforced." [Lok Sabha Debates, 28
November, 2001, Vol.20, page 476].


84. In 1948, the United Nations made its own pronouncement on compulsory education. Article 26(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights made free and compulsory education a lofty if not enforceable goal. While many states consider it an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations Charter, the Declaration is not a treaty and is not intended to be legally binding. Article 26(1) states:

"Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."

85. Our original Framers put a similar emphasis on the matter, placing free and compulsory education in the Directive Principles. The un-amended Article 45 provided that:

"The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this
Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years."

86. At this juncture, I deem it appropriate to refer to the Parliamentary Debate on the aspect of free and compulsory education. In the Lok Sabha debate of 28 November 2001 at Vol. 20, Shri M.V.V.S. Murthi, at page 499, stated:

"Unless the Government makes primary education compulsory, no village can develop. If I say what they
are doing in Andhra Pradesh, some Members may again cry foul. In Andhra Pradesh, we are having
Education Committees. If there are any dropouts, the Committee will go to the village and find out the
reason as to why they have dropped out. It is very important."

87. The Report of the Kothari Commission, 1964-1966, headed by Prof. D. S. Kothari, provided important recommendations on compulsory education. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the day compelled it to soften its suggestions. The Nation was relatively poor and could not afford drastic increases in
education spending. Some excerpts of this report are reproduced as under:

"5.01. But in any given society and at a given time, the decisions regarding the type, quantity and quality
of educational facilities depend partly upon the resources available and partly upon the social and
political philosophy of the people. Poor and traditional societies are unable to develop even a programme of universal primary education. But rich and industrialized societies provide universal secondary
education and expanding and broad-based programmes of higher and adult education. Feudal
and aristocratic societies emphasize education for a few. But democratic and socialistic societies
emphasize mass education and equalization of educational opportunities. The principal problem to be
faced in the development of human resources, therefore, is precisely this: How can available
resources be best deployed to secure the most beneficial form of educational development? How
much education, of what type or level of quality, should society strive to provide and for whom?
5.03 Increasing the Educational Level of Citizens. In the next two decades the highest priority must be
given to programmes aimed at raising the educational level of the average citizen. Such programmes are
essential on grounds of social justice, for making democracy viable and for improving the productivity of
the average worker in agriculture and industry. The most crucial of these programmes is to provide, as
directed by Article 45 of the Constitution, free and compulsory education of good quality to all children
up to the age of 14 years. In view of the immense human and physical resources needed, however, the
implementation of this programme will have to be phased over a period of time."

88. When Article 21A was introduced, some Members of Parliament argued that financially poor parents who fail to send their children to school should not be punished and that the word "compulsion" in this Article should be understood to apply exclusively to the State.

89. Let me examine this argument. The 86th Amendment made three changes to the Constitution. It added Articles 21A and 51A(k) and amended Article 45. I turn my focus to Article 51A (k). In addition to rejecting an amendment that would have neutered compulsory education, the Parliament made a positive
gesture. Though it never passed legislation seeking to implement compulsory education, it had not completely ignored the subject. From Article 51A (k), it becomes clear that parents would be responsible for sending their children to school. Article 51A read with 51A (k) is reproduced as under:

"It shall be the duty of every citizen of India who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for
education to his child or, as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen years."

90. Just as Article 51A (a) does not penalize disrespect of the National Flag, Article 51A(k) does not penalize parents/guardian for failing to send children to school. There is, of course, legislation that gives teeth to Article 51A(a). (See: The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, Section 3A).

91. Article 51A (k) indicates that it is parents, not the State, who are responsible for making sure children wake up on time and reach school. Thus, Article 21A read with Article 51A (k) distributes an obligation amongst the State and parents: the State is concerned with free education, parents with compulsory.
Notwithstanding parental duty, the State also has a role to play in ensuring that compulsory education is feasible a topic I will cover below.

92. The Central Government has made some effort to fulfill its obligation under Article 21A with regard to "free education." Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan is one such example. When it comes to "compulsory education," the Central Government has made no such effort. The Parliament has not passed any legislation. The
executive has not issued any order. What we have is a patchwork of different State and Union Territory laws. These States/UTs (and NCR) include: Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Goa,
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Delhi,
Andaman & Nicobar Islands.

93. The majority of the States and Union Territories levy very small fines on parents. I note that these laws do not go into effect with one unexcused absence. Notice is given to the parents, giving them time to remedy the problem. Of course, enforcement is almost always a different story.

94. In contrast to the relatively light aforementioned sentences, the Compulsory Education Bill, 2006 introduced in the Rajya Sabha would provide six months imprisonment as a penalty for those who preclude children from going to school. If this Bill becomes law, Section 7 would dictate the following:

"If any person including parents of children prevents any boy or girl child from going to school or causes
hindrance or obstruction in any way, he shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to
six months."

95. It seems that the Bill simultaneously targets employers and parents. Employers would be punished when they hire a child to work too much or during school hours. Similarly, parents would also be punished for allowing this to happen. The Bill would also provide for scholarships, free hostel facilities and other
incentives, "whenever necessary" and "as may be prescribed".

96. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others, (1997) 10 SCC 549 at page 557 at para 11, the Court explained why education should be compulsory. In essence, a citizen is only free when he can make a meaningful challenge to his fellow citizens or Government's attempt to curtail his natural freedom.
For this to happen, he needs a certain degree of education. This is why Article 21A may be the most important fundamental right. Without it, a citizen may never come to know of his other rights; nor would he have the resources to adequately enforce them. The relevant passage at para 11 reads as under:-

"A free educated citizen could meaningfully exercise his political rights, discharge social responsibilities
satisfactorily and develop a spirit of tolerance and reform. Therefore, education is compulsory. Primary
education to the children, in particular, to the child from poor, weaker sections, Dalits and Tribes and
minorities is mandatory. The basic education and employment-oriented vocational education should be
imparted so as to empower the children within these segments of the society to retrieve them from poverty and, thus, develop basic abilities to live a meaningful life Compulsory education, therefore, to
these children is one of the principal means and primary duty of the State for stability of the democracy, social integration and to eliminate social tensions."

97. In contrast to Article 51A (k), State and Union Territory laws and Parliamentary intent with regard to Article 21A, the Court in Mukti Morcha was inclined to suggest, not hold, that the State was exclusively responsible for compulsory education. It went on to reaffirm M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others (child labour matter) (1996) 6 SCC 756. In that case, the Court took up the issue of child labour in hazardous fields when it learnt of an accident in a cracker factory in Sivakasi.

98. The said case at para 28 identified poverty as the root cause of child labour:

"Of the aforesaid causes, it seems to us that poverty is basic reason which compels parents of a child,
despite their unwillingness, to get it employed. The Survey Report of the Ministry of Labour (supra) had
also stated so. Otherwise, no parents, specially no mother, would like that a tender-aged child should toil
in a factory in a difficult condition, instead of its enjoying its childhood at home under the paternal
gaze."


99. In other words, parents send children to work because parents have no other choice. Food comes first. If the State does not provide extra income so as to remove the incentive to send children to work, it is wasting its time on mere gesture. The Court in para 29 concluded that action must be taken:

"It may be that [child labour] would be taken care of to some extent by insisting on compulsory education. Indeed, Neera [Burns] thinks that if there is at all a blueprint for tackling the problem of child labour, it is education. Even if it were to be so, the child of a poor parent would not receive education, if per force it has to earn to make the family meet both the ends. Therefore, unless the family is assured of income aliunde, problem of child labour would hardly get solved; and it is this vital question which has
remained almost unattended. We are, however, of the view that till an alternative income is assured to the family, the question of abolition of child labour would really remain will-o'-the-wisp." (emphasis added)

100. It is interesting to note that compulsory education has been introduced in one form or the other in various countries. From the historical experience of these nations, we learn that the legislation pertaining to compulsory education has played an important role in improving educational outcomes.

? Compulsory education's roots in the United States

101. Compulsory education has had a long history outside of India. In 1852, the State of Massachusetts enacted the first compulsory attendance law in the United States; though compulsory education laws existed much earlier in many states, the first dating back to 1642 in Massachusetts. "Were Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws Effective? (See: An analysis from 1915 to 1939." (2001) at p. 2. Prof. Adriana Lleras-Muney of Princeton University.)

? Reasons from abroad for implementing compulsory education:

102. Prof. Lleras-Muney explains that those who advocated for compulsory education believed that universal education was necessary to promote democracy and guarantee a common American culture. (Page 11). Given the influx of immigrants, some of whom came from undemocratic countries, many
supporters of legislation viewed compulsory education as an instrument for assimilation.

103. Other reasons cited by compulsory education proponents in the United States included the reduction of crime, racism and inequality. Prof. Oreopoulos of the University of Toronto cites to sources that make it appear as though the reasons for adopting compulsory education in Canada mirrored those cited in the
United States: the emphasis was on good citizenship and economic development:

"Archibald Macallum, an Ontario teacher, summarized the latter argument vigorously in an 1875 report favouring the introduction of compulsory schooling in Canada: 'Society has suffered so cruelly from ignorance, that its riddance is a matter of necessity, and by the universal diffusion of knowledge
alone can ignorance and crime be banished from our midst; in no other way can the best interests of society be conserved and improved than by this one remedy the compulsory enforcement of this great boon the right of every Canadian child to receive that education that will make him a good, loyal subject, prepared to serve his country in the various social functions which he may be called on to fill during his life; and prepare him, through grace, for the life to come' (Annual Report of the Ontario Teachers' Association, 1875, as cited in Prentice and Houston 1975, 175 6). (See: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No.1, February (2006) "The compelling effects of compulsory schooling: the evidence from Canada," Prof. Oreopoulos, at page 23)."


? Empirical data indicating that compulsory education has a positive effect:

104. Prof. Oreopoulos provides data that show the fruits of imposing education on citizens. Crime may be lowered, health improved and civic activity increased. Compulsory education may also lead to a substantial increase in income for individuals. Moreover, compulsory education, if it does not cause, may at least contribute to an increase in bilingualism and employment and a reduction in poverty. The relevant portion is reproduced hereunder:

"(Page 24). Other papers find evidence of social returns, but for non-pecuniary outcomes. Lochner and
Moretti (2002), for example, find that compulsory schooling lowers crime, while Lleras-Muney (2002)
finds a correlation with improved health. In studies of the United States and United Kingdom, Dee (2003)
and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2003) estimate that tighter restrictions on leaving school early
correspond to increased levels of civic activity (like voting and discussing politics). My analysis
suggests that students compelled to complete an extra grade of school have historically experienced an
average increase of 9 15% in annual income.

(Page 48). I find that the introduction of tighter provincial restrictions on leaving school between 1920
and 1990 raised average grade attainment and incomes. Students compelled to attend an extra year
of school experienced an average increase in annual income of about 12%. I also find that compulsory
schooling is associated with significant benefits in terms of other socio-economic outcome measures
ranging from bilingualism, employment, and poverty status. These results hold up against many
specifications checks and are entirely consistent with previous studies."

105. In addition to increased income, Prof. Lleras-Muney found that legally requiring a child to attend school for one more year increased educational attainment by roughly five percentage points. (Page 8). Educational attainment refers to time spent in school.

? Example of compulsory education statutes

106. The causes of low enrolment, high drop-out rates and frequent truancy in the U.S. and India differ, but the consequences thereof do not. In either case, citizens who lack education are at an extreme disadvantage. In India, poverty has been identified as the ultimate cause of lackluster enrolment and
attendance rates. Children are compelled to work. In developed countries like the United States or Canada, children rarely fail to attend school because of economic constraints. Instead, a number of different factors may contribute to truancy. High school students may drop out " because they detest school, lack motivation, or anticipate little reward from graduation." (See: The Canadian Journal of Economics, "The compelling effects of compulsory schooling: the evidence from Canada," Prof.
Oreopoulos, p. 23, (quoting from Eckstein, Zvi, and Kenneth I. Wolpin (1999) "Why youths drop out of high school: the impact of preferences, opportunities, and abilities," Econometrica 67, 1295 339).

107. As I detail below, students and parents in the United States often face the same fines when students fail to attend school. Fines for students make more sense when low self-control is the
reason for which they fail to attend school. At the same time, punishing Indian students who have no choice but to work would make no sense. Such a punishment should not be borrowed from the United States.

108. In many jurisdictions in the United States, the attendance officer is responsible for enforcing compulsory attendance laws for his area or school. Given the overwhelming problem of sub-par enrolment and attendance in India, we doubt that one school official could sufficiently do the work of inspecting places of employment for children who have violated attendance laws.

109. Indeed, existing legislation in India already envisages the employment of attendance officers. The Delhi Primary Education Act, 1960, Sec. 7. Yet, there is nothing to suggest that these employees have adequately dealt with truancy. As mentioned, this is, in part, due to the economic conditions in which many parents find themselves. Financial assistance or incentives must be given. Only then, may the Government actively enforce compulsory attendance legislation.

110. We must also remember that it is not only the child who fails to attend but also the child who fails to enroll that has violated an attendance law.

111. Before taking issue with State/Union Territory compulsory education statutes, I note that education has traditionally been reserved for the States. Only in 1976, vide the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, did education become a part of Concurrent List of Schedule 7. In its 165th Report, the Law Commission of India has also recommended enactment of Central Legislation in this respect. Putting education in the Concurrent List turns out to be a positive development, given the States' failure to provide effective legislation.

112. The States' laws fail on two accounts. First, they are too lenient to have a deterrent effect. Second, the legislation is not adequately enforced, in part, because it does not require police
officers to do the job. If we analyze the legislation passed by different States, another conclusion becomes obvious: no State has provided for an adequate punishment whose effect would be
to deter citizens from committing a violation.

113. It is necessary to reproduce some of the various compulsory education laws of the States.

114. Under Section 7 of The Tamil Nadu Compulsory Elementary Education Act, 1994:

"Every parent or guardian of a child of school age who fails to discharge his duty under section 4 [duty of
parent to cause child to attend elementary school] shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one
hundred rupees."

115. Section 18(1) of The Delhi Primary Education Act, 1960 states:

"If any parent fails to comply with an attendance order passed under Section 13, he shall be punishable with fine not exceeding two rupees, and, in the case of continuing contravention, with an additional fine not exceeding fifty naye paise for every day during which such contravention continues after conviction for the first of such contraventions. Provided that the amount of fine payable by any one person in respect of any child in any one year shall not exceed fifty rupees."

116. Analysis of these State laws reveals that they are weak in character and perhaps have never been implemented. If we compare these laws with their sister statutes in United States, we realize that the U.S. laws are far stronger.

117. In Wisconsin, parents who fail to send their children to school may have to pay a fine of not more than $500 or face imprisonment for not more than 30 days or both. [Wisconsin Statute Sections 118.15(1)(a) and 118.15(5)(a)1.a]. For a second or subsequent offense, they may face a fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days or both. [Wisconsin Statute Sections 118.15(1)(a) and 118.15(5)(a)1.b]. Alternatively, they may be sentenced to perform community service. [Wisconsin Statute Sections 118.15(1)(a) and 118.15(5)(a)2] . Unlike Wisconsin, Tamil Nadu and Delhi's laws have no teeth.

118. The other main problem is implementation of these laws. Neither the State Governments nor their police agencies are at all serious about implementing these compulsory laws. There are hardly any cases where even fines have been imposed. Some form of compulsory education has been on the statute books
since 1917. We have seen Western countries enforce these laws. Most Western countries enjoy almost universal literacy while 35% of our population is illiterate. While a robust financial incentive programme may not have been possible in 1917, it is today. If we wish to develop further, we must educate each and every citizen aged six to fourteen.

119. In order to give effect to the constitutional right under Article 21A, it is imperative that the Central Government pass suitable legislation. The fine should be suitably increased. Imprisonment should be a sentencing option as well. The current patchwork of State/UT legislation on compulsory education is insufficient. Small monetary fines do not go far enough to ensure the implementation of Article 21A.

120. A disclaimer is attached to these recommendations. The recommendations for the enforcement of compulsory education are contingent upon the implementation of a financial incentive program that would make education viable for the poor. The carrot must come before the stick. If there is no financial
incentive program in place, the Government cannot expect the poorest of the poor to send their children to school.

121. The Parliament should criminally penalize those parents who receive financial benefits and, despite such payments, send their children to work and penalize those employers who preclude children from attending school or completing homework. It has become necessary that the Government set a
realistic target within which it must fully implement Article 21A regarding free and compulsory education for the entire country. The Government should suitably revise budget allocations for education. The priorities have to be set correctly. The most important fundamental right may be Article 21A, which, in the larger interest of the nation, must be fully implemented. Without Article 21A, the other fundamental rights are effectively rendered meaningless. Education stands above other rights, as one's ability to enforce one's fundamental rights flows from one's education. This is ultimately why the judiciary must oversee Government spending on free and compulsory education.

122. At the same time, spending is an area in which the judiciary must not overstep its constitutional mandate. The power of the purse is found in Part V, Chapter II of the Constitution, which is dedicated to the Parliament. (See: Articles 109 and 117 for "Money Bills.") Nevertheless, it remains within the judiciary's scope to ensure that the fundamental right under Article 21A of Part III is upheld. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (vehicular pollution) (1998) 6 SCC 63, this Court did not ignore the Article 21 right to life when deadly levels of pollution put the right at stake. Nor will this Court ignore the Article 21A
right to education, when a dearth of quality schooling put it in jeopardy. The Government's education programmes and expenditures, wanting in many respects, are an improvement over past performance. They nearly fall short of the constitutional mark. Lackluster performance in primary/secondary schools is caused in part because Government places college students on a higher pedestal. Money will not solve all our education woes, but a correction of priorities in step with the Constitution's mandate will go a long way.

? Opposition to Compulsory Education

123. "Compulsory" connotes enforcement. The Parliament rejected an amendment that would have saved parents from penal penalties. If education were not compulsory, who checks in with parents who have sent their children to work? If no authorities inquire, the message is clear: We, the State, do not
care if your child goes to school. Taking the opposing view, Shri G.M. Banatwalla wanted to make sure parents were not punished:

"this word 'compulsion' needs to be properly defined. The word, 'compulsion' is not to be related to the
student or the parents. Parents cannot be penalized for being too poor to send their children to school.
The word, 'compulsion' has to be understood in relation to the State and the obligation of the State to
provide for free education. p. 523." (See: The Parliamentary Debates on Article 21A, p. 523, 28
November 2001 at Vol. 20, No. 6-10)

124. The Parliament had the opportunity to accept such a definition of "compulsory." But they chose otherwise. Amendment number four, moved by Shri G.M. Banatwalla at p. 548, stated that:

"Provided that in making any law to provide for free and compulsory education under this article, the State shall not (b) enforce any penal sanctions on a parent or guardian."

125. Of paramount importance, this Amendment was "negatived." [See p. 548]. Those who wanted a safe-haven from penal sanction for parents lost. From this vote, we know that the Parliament intended to allow for future legislation that would impose penal sanctions for violations of legislation under Article
21A.

? Conclusion on Free and Compulsory Education

126. Given that so many children drop out of, or are absent from, school before they turn fourteen, "free education" alone cannot solve the problem. The current patchwork of laws on compulsory education is insufficient. Monetary fines do not go far enough to ensure that Article 21A is upheld.

127. A carrot-and-stick approach appears to be the best way to implement Article 21A. Financial incentive programmes have worked well in other countries. We should follow their lead. Once that is done, the Government should strictly enforce effective compulsory education laws. Such a policy is bound to
pay off.

continued