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IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2056 of 1999
PETITIONER:
BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY
& ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT: ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
24/09/2001
BENCH: S.
Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju.
JUDGEMENT
Raju, J.
The only
and important question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal
is as to whether the appellant-University created
under the Bharathidasan University
Act, 1981 [hereinafter referred to as the University
Act] having its area of operation over the Districts of Tiruchirappalli,
Thanjavur and Pudukkottai in the State of Tamil Nadu, should seek prior
approval of the All India Council for the Technical Education [hereinafter
referred to as AICTE] to start a department
for imparting a course or programme in technical education or a technical
institution as an adjunct to the University
itself to conduct technical courses of its choice and selection.
The Bharathidasan
University Act, 1981 created the University
in question to provide, among other things, for instruction and training
in such branches of learning as it may determine; to provide for research
and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge; to institute
degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions; to hold
examinations and to confer degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic
distinctions on persons who have pursued an approved course of study in a University
college or laboratory or in an affiliated or approved college and have
passed the prescribed examinations of the University;
to confer honorary degrees or other academic distinction under conditions
prescribed; and to institute, maintain and manage institutes of research, University
colleges and laboratories, libraries, museums and other institutions
necessary to carry out the objects of the University,
etc.
In other
words, it is a full-fledged University
recognized by the University Grants Commission
also.
When the
appellant-University commenced courses in
technology such as Information Technology & Management,
Bio-Engineering & Technology, Petrochemical Engineering &
Technology, Pharmaceutical Engineering and Technology, etc., the AICTE
filed a Writ Petition No.14558 of 1998 before the Madras High Court
seeking for a writ of mandamus to forebear the University
authorities from running/conducting any courses and programme in those
technical courses. The sum and substance of the grievance as well as the
objection put forward was that the University
did not apply for and secure the prior approval for those courses before
their commencement by the University as
envisaged under the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987
[hereinafter referred to as the AICTE Act] and
the statutory regulations made thereunder by the AICTE,
particularly Regulation No.4, which obligated even an University
to obtain such prior approval. The stand of the appellant-University
was, as it is now before us, that the appellant-University
will not fall under the definition of Technical Institution as
defined under Section 2 (h) of the AICTE Act
and consequently, the regulations made for seeking prior approval of the AICTE
even by the Universities to commence a course or programme in technical
education or a new department for the purpose, were in excess of the
regulation-making powers of the AICTE and
consequently, are null and void and cannot be enforced against the
appellant-University to the extent it
obligates even Universities to seek and secure such prior approval from
the AICTE.
The
learned Single Judge has chosen to accept the stand of the AICTE by applying and following the
ratio of the decision of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
reported in M. Sambasiva Rao alias Sambaiah & Ors. Vs.
Osmania University, Hyderabad rep. By its
Registrar & Ors. [1997(1) Andhra Law Times 629] and as a consequence
thereof, ordered the cancellation of the admissions made by the University.
When the
matter was pursued before a Division Bench, the learned Judges in the
Division Bench also felt convinced of the ratio laid down by the Full
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and rejected the appeal,
necessitating the appellant-University to come
to this Court. Since the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and
the Division Bench are on the same lines as the one adopted by the Full
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which the Madras High Court has
also purported to follow, it would be just and necessary to refer to the
said decision and also consider the correctness or otherwise of the ratio
in the said decision.
In M.
Sambasiva Rao (supra), while adverting to the relevant provisions of the University
Grants Commission Act, 1956, the Andhra Pradesh State Council for Higher
Education Act, the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, the AICTE
Act and the All India Council for Technical Education (Grant of approval
for starting new Technical Institutions, introduction of courses or
programmes and approval of intake capacity of seats for the courses or
programmes) Regulations, 1994 [hereinafter referred to as`the
Regulations], the High Court arrived at a conclusion that the AICTE
Act being a special law on a particular category of education, overrides
even the University Grants Commission Act,
which, in the opinion of the High Court, was in the nature of a general
law in regard to imparting of education by Universities in general in
respect of common matters covered thereunder. In spite of both the Acts
being those made by the Parliament within its legislative competence even
as later law, the AICTE Act, was held to be
binding. As for the relative operation of the AICTE
Act and the State Act dealt with therein, it was held that the AICTE
Act occupied the field and that, therefore, the State Act has to yield and
consequently statutory regulations made are not only valid and had the
force of law as a subordinate legislation, but no question of repugnancy
between the Regulations and AICTE Act or any
alleged excess exercise of power in framing such regulations, arose on the
facts of the case having regard to the creation of the AICTE
for the proper planning and coordinated development of technical education
system throughout the country. The Andhra Pradesh High Court was of the
view that anybody or everyone of the authorities and institutions
concerned with a technical education all over the country would fall
within the meaning of Technical Institution as defined in Section 2 (h) of
the AICTE Act and, therefore, be bound by the
authority of the AICTE under the AICTE
Act and the Regulations made thereunder. In coming to such conclusions,
the Full Bench tried to draw sustenance from the decisions of this Court
reported in Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of
A.P. [1993(1) SCC 645] and State of Tamil Nadu Vs.
Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Ors. [1995(4) SCC 104].
Shri
Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-University,
urged that a university like the appellant as
defined under Section 2 (i) will not fall within the definition of a
technical institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the AICTE
Act and, therefore, equally stood outside the purview of Section 10 (1)
(k) of the said Act and consequently not obliged to seek for and obtain
the prior approval of the AICTE for starting a
department or introducing new
courses or programmes. The regulations framed by the AICTE
for the same reason insofar as it obligates even universities to obtain
such prior approval, cannot be held to be binding or enforceable against
the appellant by the mere fact that the regulation specifically states so,
notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Act stipulating to the
contrary and any regulation so made will be void and unenforceable. It was
also urged that the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court does not lay down the correct position of law and the decisions of
this Court relied upon in the said decision really do not lend any support
to the principles ultimately laid down therein and, therefore, the Madras
High Court ought to have considered the issues independently and not
followed the ratio of the Full Bench in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra).
The strong grievance ventilated on behalf of the appellant is that both
the Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts have failed to properly construe
the relevant provisions of the Act, applying the correct principles of
interpretation and also giving due consideration and weight to the various
stipulations contained in Section 10 which made specific reference
wherever the universities also have to adhere to the provisions of the AICTE
Act, Rules and Regulations. It was also urged that no Rules or Regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act could have been either made
under the Act or sought to be enforced, legitimately.
Strong
reliance has also been placed on the decisions reported in S.K. Singh
& Others vs V.V. Giri & another
(AIR 1970 SC 2097); D.K. Trivedi & Sons and others vs
State of Gujarat and others (AIR 1986 SC 1323) as also the very decision
in
Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others vs State of
Andhra Pradesh and others [(1993) 1 SCC 645] and State of T.N. and another
vs Adhiyaman Educational & Research
Institute and others [(1995) 4 SCC 104] and Medical Council of India vs
State of Karnataka and others [(1998) 6 SCC 131].
Dr. J.P.
Verghese, learned counsel for the AICTE, while
drawing sustenance from the reasoning of the judgment under challenge as
well as the Andhra Pradesh case, urged that having regard to the overall
functions and powers of the Council under the Act to ensure proper
planning and coordinated development of the technical education system
throughout the country, the qualitative improvement of such education and
regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical
education system and matters connected therewith envisaged under Section
10 of the Act particularly Section 10 (1) (k) read with Section 20 (1) (b)
of the ATE Act, the AICTE will have pervasive
control over universities also and consequently, the prior approval of AICTE
has to be obtained by even the universities like any other technical
institution for starting any new department or institute or commencing a
new course or programme in technical education. The totality of the
purpose and scheme, claimed to be underlying the enactment is said to
confer such sweeping powers over all functional activities relating to
technical education and the universities cannot claim immunity from such
obligation cast under the Act and the regulations made by the AICTE.
The sheet anchor of support for the respondent seem to be the decision
reported in State of T.N. and another vs
Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute and others (supra) and
Jaya
Gokul Educational Trust vs Commissioner &
Secretary to Government Higher Education Department, Thiruvanathapuram,
Kerala State and another [(2000) 5 SCC 231], in addition to the decision
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
We have
bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made on either
side. When the legislative intent is found specific mention and expression
in the provisions of the Act itself, the same cannot be whittled down or
curtailed and rendered nugatory by giving undue importance to the
so-called object underlying the Act or the purpose of creation of a body
to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the Act, particularly
when the AICTE Act does not contain any
evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the authority or autonomy
of other statutory bodies, having their own assigned roles to perform.
Merely activated by some assumed objects or desirabilities, the Courts
cannot adorn the mantle of legislature.
It is hard to ignore the legislative intent to give definite meaning to
words employed in the Act and adopt an interpretation which would tend to
do violence to the express language as well as the plain meaning and
patent aim and object underlying the various other provisions of the Act.
Even in endeavouring to maintain the object and spirit of the law to
achieve the goal fixed by the legislature, the Courts must go by the
guidance of the words used and not on certain pre-conceived notions of
ideological structure and scheme underlying the law. In the statement of
objects and reasons for the AICTE Act, it is
specifically stated that the AICTE was
originally set up by a Government resolution as a National Expert Body to
advice the Central and State Governments for ensuring the coordinated
development of technical education in accordance with approved standards
was playing an effective role, but, however, in recent years, a large
number of private engineering colleges and polytechnics have come up in
complete disregard of the guidelines, laid down by the AICTE
and taking into account the serious deficiencies of even rudimentary
infrastructure necessary for imparting proper education and training and the need to
maintain educational standards and curtail the growing erosion of
standards statutory authority was meant to be conferred upon AICTE
to play its role more effectively by enacting the AICTE
Act.
Section
2 (h) defines `technical institution for the purposes of
the Act, as follows:-
technical
institution means an institution, not being a University,
which offers courses or programmes of technical education, and shall
include such other institutions as the Central Government may, in
consultation with the Council, by notification in the Official Gazette,
declare as technical institutions.
Since it
is intended to be other than a University, the
Act defines in Section 2 (i) `University to
mean a University defined under clause (f) of
Section 2 of the University Grants Commission
Act, 1956 and also to be inclusive of an institution deemed to be a University
under Section 3 of the said Act. Section 10 of the Act enumerates the
various powers and functions of the AICTE as
also its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfillment of the
same. One such as envisaged in Section 10 (1) (k) is to grant approval for
starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or
programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned. Section 23, which
empowers the Council to make regulations in the manner ordained therein
emphatically and specifically, mandates the making of such regulations
only not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules. The
Act, for all purposes and throughout maintain the distinct identity and
existence of `technical institutions and `universities and it is in
keeping tune with the said dichotomy that wherever the University
or the activities of the University is also to
be supervised or regulated and guided by the AICTE,
specific mention has been made of the University
alongside the technical institutions and wherever the University
is to be left out and not to be roped in merely refers to the technical
institution only in Sections 10, 11 and 22(2)(b). It is necessary and
would be useful to advert to Section 10(1)(c),(g),(o) which would go to
show that Universities are mentioned alongside the `technical institutions
and clauses (k), (m), (p), (q), (s) and (u) wherein there is conspicuous
omission of reference to Universities and reference being made to
technical institutions alone. It is equally important to see that when the
AICTE is empowered to inspect or cause to
inspect any technical institutions in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of
Section 10 without any reservation whatsoever, when it comes to the
question of universities it is confined and limited to ascertaining the
financial needs or its standards of teaching, examination and research.
The inspection may be made or cause to be made of any department or
departments only and that too, in such manner as may be prescribed as
envisaged in Section 11 of the Act. Clause (t) of sub-section (1) of
Section 10 envisages the AICTE to only advice
the UGC for declaring any institution imparting technical education as a
deemed University and not do any such thing by
itself. Likewise, clause (u) of the same provision which envisage the
setting up of a National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct
evaluation of technical
institutions or programmes on the basis of guidelines, norms and standards
specified by it to make recommendation to it, or to the Council, or to the
Commission or to other bodies, regarding recognition or de-recognition of
the institution or the programme. All these vitally important aspects go
to show that the AICTE created under the Act
is not intended to be an Authority either superior to or supervise and
control the Universities and thereby super impose itself upon such
Universities merely for the reason that it is imparting teaching in
technical education or programmes in any of its Departments or Units.
A careful
scanning through of the provisions of the AICTE
Act and the provisions of the UGC Act in juxtaposition, will show that the
role of AICTE vis-a-vis the Universities is
only advisory, recommendatory and a guiding factor and thereby sub-serve
the cause of maintaining appropriate standards and qualitative norms and
not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce any sanctions by
itself, except submitting a Report to the UGC for appropriate action. The
conscious and deliberate omission to enact any such provision in the AICTE
Act in respect of Universities is not only a positive indicator but should
be also one of the determining factors in adjudging the status, role and
activities of AICTE vis-a-vis Universities and
the activities and functioning of its departments and units. All these
vitally important facets with so much glaring significance of the scheme
underlying the Act and the language of the various provisions seem to have
escaped the notice of the learned Judges, their otherwise well-merited
attention and consideration in their proper and correct perspective. The
ultra activist view articulated in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) on the
basis of supposed intention
and imagined purpose of the AICTE or the Act
constituting it, is uncalled for and ought to have been avoided, all the
more so when such an interpretation is not only bound to do violence to
the language of the various provisions but also inevitably render other
statutory authorities like UGC and Universities irrelevant or even as
non-entities by making the AICTE a super power
with a devastating role undermining the status, authority and autonomous
functioning of those institutions in areas and spheres assigned to them
under the respective legislations constituting and governing them.
In Unni
Krishnans case (supra), this Court was not concerned with issues of the
nature now sought to be raised and the observations made therein in the
context of disputes pertaining to the powers, rights and extent to which
the State Legislature or Government could interfere, regulate or prohibit
the rights to establish and run professional colleges cannot be taken out
of their context and purpose to be pressed into service in this case. As a
matter of fact, even this Court, which formulated a scheme to prevent
evils of capitation fees etc., specifically excluded from its purview
colleges run by the Government and the Universities. Equally, the
consideration in Adhiyaman Engineering College case (supra), the question
was as to the relative scope and extent of control of a professional
engineering college by the State Government in the teeth of the AICTE
Act and the powers exercisable by the AICTE under
the provisions of the said Act, Rules and Regulations made thereunder. The
decisions, the correctness of which are under our consideration in this
case, have not kept into consideration before the nature and character of
the issues raised in the two decisions of this Court noticed above before
relying upon the observations contained therein in dealing with the rights
of an university constituted under a State
enactment, which, apart from the enactment constituting it, is governed by
the provisions of the UGC Act, also made by the Parliament. The decision
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) has
unduly oversimplified and underscored the status, position, as well as the
importance of the UGC by stating that the UGC was concerned only with the
object of providing grants and financial assistance to educational
institutions and serving as a recommendatory and regulatory body
completely loosing sight of its superior, vital and exclusive role
ordained to it by the Parliament itself as an expert body in regard to
Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical institutions, and the
standards of teaching and examination in universities, even in the absence
of the UGC and that too without a proper and comparative
consideration of the relative scope and effect of the respective role of
the UGC as well as the AICTE.
It is by
now well-settled that Parliament has enacted the University
Grants Commission Act, 1956 as well as the AICTE
Act, 1987 in the purported exercise of the powers envisaged in Entry 66 of
List-I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which reads as
Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical institutions. It was
permissible for the Parliament to enact a law with the object and aim of
co-ordination and determination of standards among a particular class or
category of institutions, which may deal with different kinds of education
and research as also scientific and technical institutions of different
disciplines and specialised branches of even such disciplines. The
Parliament, while enacting the AICTE Act,
was fully alive to the existence, in full force and effect the provisions
of the UGC Act, 1956, which specifically dealt with the co- oordination
and determination of standards at university
level of institutions as well as institutions for higher studies of the
category or class other than but deemed to be universities and yet roped
into the definition of technical institution only institutions not being a
University as defined in Section 2 (i).
Apart from
so defining technical Institutions so as to be exclusive of University
even in empowering the AICTE to do certain
things, special care seems to have been conspicuously and deliberately
taken to make specific mention of universities, wherever and whenever
alone the AICTE was expected to interact with
universities and University Departments as
well as its constituent Institutions. In the statement of objects to the AICTE
Act, the evil sought to be curbed was stated to be the coming up
indiscriminately of number of private engineering colleges and
polytechnics in complete disregard of the guidelines resulting in diluted
standards, unplanned growth, inadequate facilities and lack of
infra-structural facilities in them and not of any anomalies arising out
of any university bodies or UGC to even think
of either sidelining or subjugating them by constituting AICTE.
The
guarded language employed for the said purpose and deliberate omission to
refer to the universities in Section 10 (1) (k) of the AICTE
Act while empowering AICTE to accord approval
for starting new technical institutions and introduction of new programmes
or courses by or in such institutions cannot be ignored to be of any
insignificance.
A careful
analysis of the various provisions contained in Sections 10,11 and 22 will
further go to show that the role of interaction conferred upon AICTE
vis-a-vis Universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring the proper
maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system so as
to conform to the standards laid down by it, with no further or direct
control over such universities or scope for any direct action except
bringing it to the notice of the UGC or other authorities only, of any
lapses in carrying out any directions of the AICTE
in this regard, for appropriate action.
While
stating that autonomy of universities should not mean a permission for authoritarian
functioning, the High Courts by the construction placed by them have
virtually allowed such authoritarianism to the AICTE
to such an extent as to belittle the importance and elegant role assigned
to the universities in the Educational system of the country and rendered
virtually subordinate to the AICTE. In our
view, that does not seem to
be the object of creating AICTE or passing of
the AICTE Act. Such construction as has been
placed by the Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) which found favour
of acceptance of the Court in the present case ought to have been avoided
and the same could neither be said to have been intended or was ever in
the contemplation of the Parliament nor should the UGC and the
universities been relegated to a role subordinate to the AICTE.
The UGC and universities have always had and have an accepted and
well-merited role of Primacy to play in shaping as well as stepping up a
co-ordinated development and improvement in the standards of education and
research in the sphere of education. When it is only Institutions other
than universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not correct to
state in the decisions under challenge that an University,
which cannot grant affiliation to a technical institution, cannot grant
the same to itself. Consequently, the conclusions rendered based on the
principles for classifying enactments into `general law and `special law
to keep them within their respective limits or area of operation are not
warranted and wholly uncalled for and do not merit our approval or
acceptance.
The AICTE
cannot, in our view, make any regulation in exercise of its powers under
Section 23 of the Act, notwithstanding sub-section (1), which though no
doubt enables such regulations being made generally to carry out the
purposes of the Act, when such power is circumscribed by the specific
limitation engrafted therein to ensure them to be not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Act and the rules. So far as the question of
granting approval, leave alone prior or post, Section 10(1)(k)
specifically confines the limits of such power of AICTE
only to be exercised vis-Ã -vis technical institutions, as defined
in the Act and not generally. When the language is specific, unambiguous
and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give an expansive meaning
under the pretext of a purposive construction to perpetuate an ideological
object and aim, which also, having regard to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the AICTE Act, are not warranted
or justified. Therefore, the regulation insofar as it compels the
universities to seek for and obtain prior approval and not to start any
new department or course or programme in technical education (Regulation
4) and empower itself to withdraw such approval, in a given case of
contravention of the regulations (Regulation 12) are directly opposed to
and inconsistent with the provisions of Section 10(1)(k) of the Act and
consequently void and unenforceable.
The fact
that the regulations may have the force of law or when made have to be
laid down before the legislature concerned do not confer any more sanctity
or immunity as though they are statutory provisions themselves.
Consequently, when the power to make regulations are confined to certain
limits and made to flow in a well defined canal within stipulated banks,
those actually made or shown and found to be not made within its confines
but outside them, the courts are bound to ignore them when the question of
their enforcement arise and the mere fact that there was no specific
relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly
when the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings
cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is
shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore, be a
myth to state that regulations made under Section 23 of the Act have
Constitutional and legal status, even unmindful of the fact that anyone or
more of them are found to be not consistent with specific provisions of
the Act itself. Thus, the regulations in question, which the AICTE
could not have made so as to bind universities/UGC within the confines of
the powers conferred upon it, cannot be enforced against or bind an University
in the matter of any necessity to seek prior approval to commence a new
department or course and programme in technical education in any university
or any of its departments and constituent institutions.
To put it
in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of AICTE
Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a `University,
the same has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. For
example, while under clause (k) of Section 10 only `technical institutions
are referred to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the guidelines for
admission of students to `technical institutions and `Universities
imparting technical education. If we look at the definition of a
`technical institution under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is clear that a
`technical institution cannot include a `University.
The clear intention of the Legislature is not that all institutions
whether University or otherwise ought to be
treated as `technical institutions covered by the Act. If that was the
intention, there was no difficulty for the Legislature to have merely
provided a definition of `technical institution by not excluding `University
from the definition thereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use
alongside both the words `technical institutions and University
in several provisions in the Act.
The
definition of `technical institution excludes from its purview a `University'.
When by definition a `University' is excluded
from a `technical institution, to interpret that such a clause or such an
expression wherever the expression `technical institution occurs will
include a `University will be reading into the
Act what is not provided therein. The power to grant approval for starting
new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or
programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned is covered by
Section 10 (k) which would not cover a `University'
but only a `technical institution'. If Section 10 (k) does not cover a `University'
but only a `technical institution', a regulation cannot be framed in such a
manner so as to apply the regulation framed in respect of `technical
institution to apply for Universities when the Act maintains a complete
dichotomy between a `University and a
`technical institution. Thus, we have to
focus our attention mainly to the Act in question on the language
adopted in that enactment. In that view of the matter, it is, therefore,
not even necessary to examine the scope of other enactments or whether the
Act prevails over the University Act or effect
of competing entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-a-vis
Entry 25 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The fact
that initially the syndicate of the appellant-university
passed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE
and did not pursue the matter on those lines thereafter or that the other
similar entities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same and
that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) taken
a particular view of the matter are not reasons which can be countenanced
in law to non-suit the appellant. Nor such reasons could be relevant or
justifying factors to draw any adverse finding against and deny relief by
rejecting the claims of the appellant-university.
We also place on record the statement of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is the correct position
of law, that the challenge of the appellant with reference to the
Regulation in question and claim of the AICTE
that the appellant-university should seek and
obtain prior approval of the AICTE to start a
department or commence a new course or programme in technical education
does not mean that they have no obligation or duty to conform to the
standards and norms laid down by the AICTE for
the purpose of ensuring co-ordinated and integrated development of
technical education and maintenance of standards.
For all
the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and consequently set aside
the judgment under challenge by dismissing the writ petition filed in the
High Court. Having regard to the position of law declared by us, the
decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in M. Sambasiva Raos
case (supra) cannot also be considered to lay down the correct position of
law. No costs.
J. [ S.
Rajendra Babu ]
J. [
Doraiswamy Raju ]
September
24, 2001.
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